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Abstract  
Past climate change literature paid great attention to the welfare analysis of 
international agreements that stabilize emissions over time on the basis of the New 
Welfare Economics approach claiming “objective” measures of well-being and 
excluding interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, by using non New Welfare 
Economics approaches we show that the involvement of developing countries is 
not a desirable policy option. The implementation of a “Kyoto for ever” scenario 
including only developed regions could be recommended because improves both 
environment and welfare also if it does not generate a turning point in the 
relationship between income and pollution (PIR). The Environmental Kuznets 
Curve hypothesis (EKC) implies that a bell shaped PIR would induce policy-makers 
to pursue economic growth in order to overcome the air pollution issue. This 
normative prescription crucially focuses on the role played by the existence of a 
turning point in a context where only two sustainability dimensions are important: 
the economic and the environmental one. Our analysis shows that when we 
introduce a welfare analysis, policy implications based only on the turning point 
existence and consequently on the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis could 
be misleading. In our study a “win-win” policy as the Kyoto Protocol is 
recommended because the existence of a turning point could be heavily paid in 
terms of welfare. However results are sensitive to the choice of the welfare 
measure.. 
 
Keywords: Environmental Kuznets Curve, climate change, welfare, income 
distribution.. 
JEL Classification: H0, H3, I3 
 
                                                 






















































Social choice in economics literature followed a long history, but it has seldom been connected to 
the environmental literature and in particular to the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis. In the 
eighteenth century after the ideological incentive provided by the French Revolution and the birth 
of  democracy  Borda  and  Condorcet  showed  the  problems  connected  in  social  choice  by  a 
democratic voting rule. 
   2 
Bentham introduced utilitarianism and the concept that the social welfare of a community can be 
accounted as the sum of utilities enjoyed by each individual. A cardinal approach was involved in 
the benthamian world and no distributional issues were considered. In the thirtieths the cardinal 
social  welfare  function  was  replaced  by  person’s  respective  ordering  of  social  states.  Again 
interpersonal comparisons of utility gains and losses were neglected. The underlying criticism was 
that  interpersonal  comparisons  of  utility  had  no  scientific  basis.  This  change  limited  the 
informational basis on which to build the social choice. 
 
In this new framework in the first half of the nineteenth century the New Welfare Economics 
(NEW) and the Pareto Criterion gave an important contribution in evaluating welfare changes in 
policies. The basic idea was that an alternative solution can be considered better if the change 
increases the utility of everyone, or at least, if it enhances the utility of at least one person and does 
not harm the interest o everyone. A further refinement of the Pareto criterion was the Kaldor-Hicks 
compensation test: if the gainers can compensate the losers and still better off  (a potential Pareto 
improvement) then the policy is justified. 
 
As pointed out by Gowdy (2005, pp.213):”The NWE vision was to establish appropriate criteria for 
evaluating distributional changes that do not involve value judgements”. In this context Arrow 
(1950) by his impossibility theorem showed that under certain conditions it is impossible to reach a 
social choice. A great pessimism involved social choice theory and the possibility to reach social 
decisions involving divergent interests and concerns. 
 
Recent developments have overcome the pessimism brought by the Arrow’s impossibility theorem. 
In particular A. Sen (1999) shows that if we enlarge informational basis for social choice and we 
allow  interpersonal  comparisons  among  individuals  the  conclusions  reached  with  the  Arrow’s 
theorem  do not  hold.  Concretely  when he writes about interpersonal comparisons  he thinks to 
important issues as the income distribution, the poverty, the famine and various forms of inequality. 
 
He rejects the traditional building blocks provided by the New Welfare Economics. Sen defends 
interpersonal comparisons of utilities based on mental states. Following Davidson (1986), he states 
that it is difficult to see how people can understand anything much about other people’s minds and 
feelings without making some comparisons with their own minds and feelings. 
 
Ng (1999) and others affirm that a Benthamian “hedonometer” could be obtained on the basis of 
scientific  measures  of  well-being  and  a  set  of  social,  environmental,  and  economic  indicators. 
Moreover  he  claims  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  focus  entirely  on  mental  states.  Utility  can  be 
considered as a matter of deprivation and “objectives” measures of need. 
 
Starting  from  non-NWE  approaches  we  have  the  opportunity  to  investigate  two  of  the  three 
dimensions mentioned in the Burtland report (1987) as necessary to investigate the sustainability 
issue: the economic and the social one. Our aim is to connect these issues with the last building 
block of the sustainability: the environmental one and in particular with the Environmental Kuznets 
curve analysis for a specific pollutant, CO2 emissions. The issue of the Environmental Kuznets 
curve has been largely debated over the last fifteen years. The normative prescription underlying the 
EKC hypothesis is extremely appealing: if we verify a bell shaped relationship between income and 
pollution, economic growth can be considered the best way to tackle the environmental issue. The 
crucial issue is the existence of a turning point in the relationship between income and pollution.  
 
Past econometric evidence about the EKC existence for CO2 emissions showed that EKC is very 
unlikely  to  exist.  The  reason  would  lie  in  the  global  nature  (Barbier,  1997)  and  in  the 
intergenerational impacts (Ansategui and Escapa, 2002) of this pollutant. Specifically in this paper   3 
we will focus on emissions stabilizing policies aiming at reducing air pollution. Our contribution in 
this paper is twofold. We will investigate by the famous integrated climate change model RICE99 if 
international policies can generate a turning point in the relationship between income and pollution 
as postulated by the EKC hypothesis and their welfare effects on the basis of non-New Welfare 
Economics approaches.  
 
EKC literature mainly consists of theoretical and econometric literature but little attention has been 
paid to numerical simulations and to the role played by emissions stabilizing policies. Moreover a 
great number of studies focus on the welfare effects of the Kyoto Protocol with or without the use 
of flexible mechanisms, but they are mainly based on New Welfare Economics approaches and 
equity implications are not analysed. Our work is aimed at filling these gaps. In climate change 
integrated  assessment  modelling  a  great  number  of  studies  focus  on  the  impacts  of  emissions 
stabilizing international policies (Dagoumas et al. 2005, Jakeman  et al. 2004, Buonanno et al. 
2003). The basic finding is that the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is costly for developed 
countries (in particular for USA), but the presence of an emission permits market, induced technical 
change or international trade can reduce the compliance costs. 
 
A wide number of papers specifically deal with the impact in terms of welfare of international 
emissions stabilizing policies. Galeotti and Buchner (2003) survey the welfare effects of the Kyoto 
Protocol implementation. They find that for Annex I countries welfare losses are between 0.5% and 
2%, for non-AnnexI countries the effects are different for energy importers (gainers) and exporters 
(losers). Kemfert (2005), Edehnofer et al. (2005), Bernstein et al. (1999) show that the introduction 
of induced technical change reduces compliance welfare costs. Kuik and Gerlagh (2003) show that 
in a global perspective the Kyoto Protocol implementation is welfare reducing, but if we assume 
international trade and follow a Kaldor-Hicks Pareto Potential improvement criterion, the net gain 
among regions is positive. However all these studies do not include equity in their analysis. This is 
the core of our work. 
 
Only  a  few  attempts  have  been  made  in  order  to  integrate  economic  and  social  issues  with 
environmental  issues  in  modelling  literature.  In  particular  only  a  few  scholars  link  social  and 
economic concerns with the climate change issue. Most of the previous studies focus on greenhouse 
gas  emissions  reductions  so  as  to  maximize  human  welfare  on  the  basis  of  a  neoclassical 
interpretation of justice (Nordhaus, 1991, Manne et al., 1995). The literature involving different 
welfare and equity issues in climate change is not wide. 
 
Rose  (1992)  provides  an  interesting  discussion  of  the  economic,  legal,  and  philosophical 
foundations  of  the  equity  criteria  applicable  to  global  warming  policy.  By  a  non-linear 
programming  model,  Rose  and  Stevens  (1993)  investigate  the  changes  of  welfare  of  permit 
allocations based on Sovereignty and Rawlsian equity criteria for 8 countries covering the spectrum 
of economic development levels. 
 
Azar and Sterner (1996) show that the estimated marginal cost of CO2 emissions can be 50-100 
times larger than the estimate by Nordhaus in his DICE model considering income distribution and 
a variable discount rate. Tol (2000) studies the implications in terms of equity in a context of 
welfare  maximising  greenhouse-gas  emission  reduction  strategies.  He  analyses  the  impact  of 
different principles of equity in emissions reduction strategies among regions. Bosello and Roson 
(1998) show that changes produced on an equity index by the imposition of emission constraints are 
not significantly higher than those obtained by the subsequent introduction of a market mechanism, 
and that the different market regimes which could be adopted have quite different distributional 
implications. Bosello, Buchner, Carraro and Raggi (2001) point out that even though more equitable   4 
burden  sharing  rules  provide  better  incentives  to  sign  and  ratify  a  climate  agreement  than  the 
burden-sharing rule implicit in the Kyoto Protocol, a stable global agreement cannot be achieved. 
 
In our work we will show that the choice of the welfare measure in the analysis of emissions 
stabilizing policies is crucial and if we focus on non-NEW measures an environmental policy as the 
implementation of a “Kyoto forever” scenario is the best option. 
 
On the basis of our analysis we will show that the existence of a turning point is not a reliable 
criterion to extract useful policy information. The existence of a turning point could be useful in 
terms of policy only if we work in a world composed of two dimensions: the economic and the 
environmental  one.  The  reality  is  something  more  complex.  If  we  add  a  third  dimension  (the 
welfare), policy recommendations based only on the turning point existence could be misleading. 
 
The paper is organised as follows: in the section 2 we present the model and scenarios, in the 
section 3 results concerning EKC, in the section 4 we will present the definitions of welfare and the 
results, finally the conclusions. 
 




Nordhaus  and  Boyer  (1999)’s  RICE  is  the  most  recent  version  of  a  regional  dynamic  general 
equilibrium model for the study of the economic aspects of climate change (Nordhaus and Yang, 
1996). The RICE model basically considers a single sector optimal growth model suitably extended 
to incorporate the interactions between economic activities and climate. There is one such model for 
each of the eight macro regions into which the world is divided: USA, Other High Income countries 
(OHI), OECD Europe (Europe), Eastern European countries (EE), Middle Income countries (MI), 
Lower Middle Income countries (LMI), China (CHN), and Low Income countries (LI). Within each 
region a central planner chooses the optimal paths of fixed investment and carbon energy input that 
maximizes the present value of per capita consumption. Nordhaus and Boyer’s starting assumption 
is  that  a  Social  Planner  optimally  runs  his/her  own  region,  indexed  by  n,  by  maximizing  the 
following discounted utility function: 
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Where C(n,t) stands for consumption, b is the discount factor and L(n,t) is the population level. The 
maximization process is subject to some constraints that capture the economic dynamics as well as 
the environmental ones. 
 
The Resource Constraint of each region links consumption with net output Y and with physical 
investments I. The following equation identifies the Resource Constraint
1: 
 
(2)  C(n,t) = Y(n,t) – I(n,t) 
  
                                                 
1 When we introduce an emissions permits market, equation (2) should also include the revenue (expenditure) for the 
sell (purchase) of permits.   5 
The gross value added obtained from the production process is described by the following equation: 
 
(3)  Q(n,t) = A(n,t)[K(n,t)
gCE(n,t)
anL(n,t)
(1-g-an)] - pe(n,t)CE(n,t) 
 
Where  A(n,t)  denotes  the  state  of  the  technology,  K(n,t)  is  physical  capital,  CE(n,t)  is  carbon 
energy, and pe(n,t)is the price of carbon energy. Apart from A(n,t) and L(n,t), all the inputs of this 
value-added equation are endogenously determined. Note that the evolution of A(n,t) accounts for 
productivity growth by production-enhancing technical change. In the model this index follows an 
exogenously determined increasing path over time. 
  
There is a wedge W between gross and net output production due to climate alterations; this wedge 
is inversely related to and driven by the damage function D(n,t): 
 
(4)  Y(n,t) = W(n,t)Q(n,t) 
 
(5)  W(n,t) = 1/D(n,t)   
 
(6)  D(n,t) =1+ q1,nT(t) + q2,nT(t)
2 
 
Where D(n,t) is the environmental damage, T(t) is the temperature and q1,n, q2,n are regionalized 
parameters capturing the temperature impact. 
 
The  environmental  damage  is  a  key  variable  explaining  how  the  model  describes  capital 
accumulation by including environmental resources. We refer to natural resources (intended as a 
flow) and not about environmental capital stocks, because the basic assumptions of this model are 
that there is an unlimited stock of natural resources and that carbon energy demand is always 
satisfied by supply. The scarcity is reflected only in the carbon price. 
 
The green technological effect is described by 
 
(7)   E(n,t) = V (n,t)CE(n,t) 
 
Where E(n,t) represents the level of emissions. Notice that the coefficient V(n,t) in (7) represents the 
emissions/carbon-energy ratio and captures the second form of technical change of the RICE99 
model:  emissions-reducing  technical  change.  This  index  of  carbon  intensity  is  exogenously 
determined and follows a negative exponential path over time. In this way, Nordhaus and Boyer 
(1999) make the assumption of a gradual, costless improvement in green technology gained by the 





In our paper we will run four scenarios for RICE99 from 1995 to 2085: 
 
      -    BAU (Business as usual) 
-  Kyoto scenario 
-  Global Kyoto scenario. 
-  Global Kyoto scenario 2. 
   6 
The BAU scenario implies no policy. In this scenario the economic growth has no limits for each 
region of the world. The non-cooperative game induces every social planner to improve economic 
development by an increasing level of emissions influencing the temperature and climate change. 
The Kyoto scenario implies a constraint on the emissions for each Annex I region (USA, OHI, 
Europe, EE) as imposed by the Kyoto Protocol over time. Moreover we include in the models a 
market of emissions trading
2. 
 
The Global Kyoto scenario implies an emission constraint for every region of the world including 
developing countries (MI, LMI, CHINA and LI). Given that the Kyoto Protocol does not include an 
emission  constraint  for  developing  countries  we  assume  that  the  emissions  constraint  for  each 
developing region is the level of emissions registered in the same region in 2015. Again we include 
in the models a market of emissions trading. 
 
The Global Kyoto 2 scenario assumes a “Kyoto forever” constraint for developed countries as the 
Global Kyoto scenario. Since 2025 the emissions constraint over time for developing countries is 
80% of the previous period BAU emissions. In this case we have no a fixed cap for poor regions, 
but the constraint is less strong. 
 
Summarizing, with the Kyoto scenario we assume a lower emission constraint on a global scale but 
not  caps  on  the  emissions  and  consequently  on  the  level  of  economic  activity  for  developing 
countries. In the Global Kyoto scenario we assume a stronger emission constraint on a global scale 
but, at the same time, we introduce a strong limit for the economic growth in developing countries. 
The Global Kyoto2 scenario implies a softer emissions constraint for developing regions. The four 
scenarios are summarized in the table 1. 
 
Table 1. Scenarios description 
Scenario  Description 
BAU  No policy. 
Kyoto  Since 2015 Kyoto forever emission constraint for Annex I regions and market of 
pollution permits. 
Global Kyoto  Since 2015 Kyoto forever emissions constraint for Annex I regions. Developing 
regions are obliged to maintain the level of emissions as in 2015. Market of pollution 
permits. 
Global Kyoto 2  Since 2015 Kyoto forever emissions constraint for Annex I regions. Since 2025 
Developing regions are obliged to maintain 80% of the previous period BAU 
emissions. Market of pollution permits. 
 
                                                 
2 The emissions permits market is introduced by a non-cooperative Nash game in a dynamic setting, which yields an 
Open Loop Nash equilibrium This is a situation where in each region the planner maximizes its utility subject to the 
individual resource and capital constraints and the climate module for a given emission production of all the other 
players. Under the possibility of emission trading, the sequence whereby a Nash equilibrium is reached must be revised 
as follows. Each region maximizes its utility subject to the individual resource and capital constraints, now including 
the Kyoto constraint, and the climate module for a given optimal set of strategies of all the other players and a given 
price of permits p(0) (in the first round this is set at an arbitrary level). When all regions have made their optimal 
choices, the overall net demand for permits is computed at the given price. If the sum of net demands in each period is 
approximately zero, a Nash equilibrium is obtained; otherwise the price is revised in proportion to the market unbalance 
and each region’s decision process starts again 
   7 
We choose these scenarios because they appear as representative to answer the questions we posed 
in this paper.  
Global  warming  has  become  a  very  worrying  environmental  issue  and  great  debate  developed 
towards emissions stabilizing policies. As we said above EKC literature showed that a bell shaped 
relationship between income and CO2 emissions is very unlikely to exist. In this paper first we will 
investigate  if  a  BAU  scenario  generates  a turning point.  If a  turning  point  is not reached and 
environmental policies are needed we will investigate the role played by international emissions 
stabilizing policies. 
We will verify if an emissions constraint involving Annex I regions is a suitable policy option 
(“Kyoto forever” scenario) in order to reach a turning point or of it is necessary to impose an 
emissions constraint also for developing countries (Global Kyoto, Global Kyoto 2 scenario). We 
assume two possible emissions constraints for developing countries to check how the relationship 
between income and pollution evolves when we change the emissions constraint for poor regions. 
The reader should notice that the Kyoto forever scenario involves also USA that have not yet 
ratified  the  Kyoto  Protocol.  We  choose  this  scenario  to  analyse  if  USA  ratification  could  be 
important in order to reach a turning point. Finally we will study the welfare impacts connected to 
each  scenario.  We  will  investigate  if  the  turning  point  existence  is  compatible  with  welfare 
improvements in emissions stabilizing policies. 
 
3. The relationship between income and pollution: the results 
 
To analyse the relationship between income and air pollution we will focus on the relationship 
between global GDP per capita and emissions per capita The past literature has widely chosen a per 
capita version of the environmental indicator for empirical studies concerning EKC, Panayatou 
(1993), Selden and Song (1994). 
 
The choice to work on a global scale lies on the discrepancy that can occur between EKC in 
individual  countries  and  EKC  in  the  world  (Dinda,  2004).  According  to  EKC  hypothesis,  the 
improvements in environmental quality are not attainable for the majority of the world population 
that has the standards of living substantially below the estimated turning points (Stern et al., 1996). 
The investigation of a world relationship between income and pollution is necessary. We consider 
the lapse of time 1995-2085. 
 
As the reader can see from the Figure 1 the BAU scenario shows an increasing relationship between 
income per capita and emissions per capita.  Precisely in RICE99 it is first decreasing and then 
continuously  increasing  and  does  not  seem  to  reach  a  turning  point.  According  to  the  EKC 
hypothesis the evidence showing an increasing relationship between income and pollution would 
suggest the need of environmental policies. 
 
From the Figure 1 we can verify the environmental consequences deriving from three policies: the 
Kyoto Protocol and two versions of the Kyoto Protocol extended to developing countries. From our 
plots it is clear that the three policies decrease emissions, but only the Global Kyoto scenario can 
generate  a  decreasing relationship between income per capita and emissions per capita. In  the 
Figure 1 the reader can verify in RICE99 a bell shaped relationship between income and pollution. 
Only if we extended the Kyoto Protocol to developing countries we could be more optimistic in 
terms of environmental sustainability. 
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Figure 1. World GDP per capita (trillions of 1990 US$/billions of population) vs world emissions per capita 
(Gigatons/ billions of population). Time period 1995-2085   
 
 
The Global Kyoto 2 scenario produces an increasing relationship between income and pollution 
because the emissions constraint for developing countries is less rigid than in Global Kyoto. This 
graph  clearly  explains  the  American  administration  argument  rejecting  the  Kyoto  Protocol 
ratification. 
 
The American government position is to refuse the Kyoto Protocol ratification claiming that the 
climate change issue should be seriously tackled by involving developing countries. The existence 
of a turning point only when developing countries are strongly included in international agreements 
confirms the American objection. The problem is to verify what would be the consequences in 
terms of welfare 
 




As first indicator we will use a traditional measure of welfare that does not include equity criteria 
and  represents  a  “metric”  measure  founded  on  economic  values.  Galeotti  and  Buchner  (2003) 
implement a welfare analysis with RICE models by considering the present discounted value of 
consumption. 
 
Specifically in this paper we will consider the present discounted value of world consumption over 
time. The measure of welfare is expressed by the following equation: 
 
(8)   W(t)  = 
1
1
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Where C(t) is the world consumption in each period t and  b  is the discount factor. As the reader 
can  easily  see  from  this  simple  measure  of  welfare  no  consideration  is  given  to  how  world 
consumption is distributed among regions over time. One of the aims of this paper is to investigate 
the  link  between  a  social  welfare  function  based  on  equity  and  international  climate  change 
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Atkinson‘s paper  (1970) is the building block of this kind of literature. In his work, he points out 
the role of the income distribution in determining welfare rankings. Specifically he proposes a very 
popular index in order to provide a useful tool for social choice and provides criteria for the ranking 
of social states depending on the level of income x for different individuals i. He considers a set of 
additive and separable Social Welfare Functions (SWFs) W as expressed in the following equation: 
 
(9)   W = 8i(xi) 
 
Atkinson proves that assuming diminishing marginal utility of income, Lorenz curves ordering can 
rank alternative social states with the same average income. However, when Lorenz curves cross, it 
is always possible to find out different concave utility functions that can differently rank social 
states. Shorrocks (1983) extends Atkinson’s formulation and introduces the concept of generalized 
Lorenz dominance. If the Lorenz curve of a distribution is L(p) and the average income of the 
distribution  is m, then the generalized Lorenz curve of this distribution  is mL(p). According to 
Shorrocks  if  the  generalized  Lorenz  curve  of  one  state  lies  above  another,  the  social  welfare 
corresponding to the first is said to be better than the latter
3. 
 
Both the Lorenz dominance and the generalized Lorenz dominance provide only partial ordering of 
the social welfare over time. In our paper for complete ordering we introduce a cardinal SWF that 
provides numerical values to all possible social states. As the Gini index (G) is defined as twice the 
area between the Lorenz curve and the egalitarian line then (1-G) is twice the area below the Lorenz 
curve. A cardinalization of the SWF can be obtained by finding the area below the generalized 
Lorenz curve. On the basis of an axioms set, Sen (1974) proposes a specific form of SWFs which is: 
 
(10)   W(t) = m(t)(1-G(t)) 
 
In our analysis m is the average world consumption and G is the consumption concentration index 
among regions.  
 
Another  important  social  welfare  function  including  the  equity  issue  derives  from  the  wide 
literature  criticising  GDP  as  the  only  factor  influencing  well-being.  England  (1998)  surveys  a 
number of quantitative measures of well-being which have been proposed as complements to or 
substitutes for GDP. Quoting England the consequent issues can be summarized as: 
 
-  The need to properly specify the distinction between intermediate and gross final output; 
-  The need to account or asset depreciation in a comprehensive manner; 
-  The  need  to  divide  net  final  output  between  consumption  and  capital accumulation  on a 
reasonable basis;   
-  The need to take into account of the welfare implications of various forms of social inequality. 
 
About the last point, England points out that the UNDP uses real per capita GDP as one component 
of the Human Development Index
4 and since 1991 an Atkinson-style utility function has been used 
to transform a nation’s income level into a measure of national social welfare U for each region n: 
 
(11)   U(n,t) = 








                                                 
3 When generalised Lorenz curves cross other theoretical contributions provide tools to rank alternative social states 
(see Atkinson A.B. and Bourgignon  F. (1987), Dardanoni V. and Lambert P. (1988)). 
4 The Human Development Index also focuses on longevity and access to education.   10 
Where y is a country’s per capita income, y
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The UNDP social welfare function has been thought to transform nations’ income levels, but with 
RICE99 we transform the consumption per capita for each region. Given U(n,t) the utility function 
of each region n, we only assume that the global social welfare function is an additive and separable 
function of the utilities enjoyed by each region. 
 
The global SWF function will be: 
 
(12)   W(t) = n U(n,t).  and U(n,t) = 







 as in (11). 
 
Besides the equations (8), (10) and (12) we will utilise another social welfare function to assess 
welfare in different environmental policies scenarios. As we previously said, Sen (1999) criticizes 
the NEW approach and considers as crucial in the social choice process not only the interpersonal 
comparisons  based  on  deprivation,  but  also  those  based  on  mental  states.  Sen  is  not  the  only 
economist who shares this vision. 
 
Gowdy (2005 pp.218) states:” It has been conclusively demonstrated that welfare changes cannot be 
evaluated without making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Yet most economists are reluctant to 
accept  “subjective”  measures  of  well-being….  The  increasingly  high  level  of  psychology  has 
helped to make the idea of measurable utility acceptable to economists”. Kahneman et al. (1997) 
claim that subjective and hedonic experience can be observed and measured. 
 
Though  in  a  wide  share  of  environmental  models  the  utility  function  is  characterized  by 
psychological assumptions about the human behaviour (monotonicity, non-satiation), economists 
generally seek monetary measures of well-being to extract useful welfare implications. As well-
being indicator in RICE99 we will consider again an additive and separable social welfare function 
depending on the utility function of each region as expressed in the equation (1). Therefore 
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By this social welfare function a transfer of one unity of consumption per capita from the richest 
countries to developing regions is welfare improving. This notion of welfare considers a discounted 
flow of consumption until the period t. The social welfare function in (13) is similar to the equation 
in (12). 
 
The main differences are: 
 
-  7KHSUHVHQFHRIWKHGLVFRXQWIDFWRU GHFUHDVLQJWKHZHLJKWDWWULEXWHGWRWKHFRQVXPSWLRQLQ
the future periods. 
-  The  constant  elasticity  of  the  marginal  utility  of  consumption  for  each  region.  The 
logarithmic form of the utility function is excluded in (11JLYHQWKDW    DQG FDQ
never be equal to one. 
-  The argument of this welfare function concerns discounted sum of consumption over time 
and not consumption in each period. This is a “stock” more than “flow” measure of welfare.    11 
The application of these welfare functions in RICE99 implies the existence of a World Social 
Planner  (WSP)  aimed  at  assessing  the  results  deriving  from  different  scenarios  and  from  the 
maximization process of each region. In applying the Sen’s social welfare function (10) the WSP 
considers  data  deriving  from  RICE99  as  representing  the  future  real  world  and  maximizes  an 
additive and separable SWF depending on the utility function of each individual as in (9). Being the 
RICE99 model based on a regional framework, in our analysis we are implicitly assuming that the 
consumption in each region is equally distributed among people. 
 
Equations (8), (10), (12) and (13) will be used to assess international emissions reducing policies. 
We are interested to evaluate if different notions of social welfare function based on different 
approaches drive to the same conclusions in terms of environmental policy. The choice of more 
welfare measures is a useful exercise to verify the robustness of our results. 
 
Our aim is twofold: 
 
-  To compare traditional measures of welfare with measures deriving from non-New Welfare 
Economics approaches in different scenarios; 
-  To extract useful policy insight from the observation of welfare paths and our previous 
investigation of emissions paths associated to our set of scenarios. 
 





First we show the results relative to the traditional measure of welfare. As the reader can easily see 
from  the  table  2  the  BAU  scenario  is  the  best  over  time  because  shows  the  highest  level  of 
discounted consumption per capita. 
The result derives from an easy intuition. Emissions constraints are costly in terms of consumption. 
In the Kyoto scenario developed countries must accomplish the binding emission constraint and are 
committed to reduce the level of economic activity and consequently the level of consumption. This 
induces a lower level of global consumption per capita. 
When we analyse the GK and GK2 scenarios, welfare losses are higher than in a Kyoto scenario. 
Emissions  constraints  strongly  penalise  growth  and  consumption  in  poor  regions.  The  world 
consumption per capita is lower because both developed and developing countries are subject to an 
emissions constraint and are constrained to decrease the level of the economic activity. 
Results are quite different when we include equity criteria in our analysis. In the table 3 we show 
the results concerning the Sen’s Social Welfare function. The reader can see that since 2015 a 
“Kyoto  forever  scenario”  always  shows  welfare  gains.  Scenarios  involving  also  developing 
countries are the worst in terms of welfare over time. 
 
These results can be easily understood reading tables showing average consumption and the value 
associated to the GINI coefficient for each scenario in the table 4. Over time the best scenario in 
terms of consumption per capita is the BAU scenario (except in 2085 where less environmental 
damage generates a higher consumption per capita in the Kyoto scenario). However the Kyoto 
scenario shows the best results in terms of equity. An emissions constraint involving developed 
countries decreases growth in rich countries and consequently growth in the world but increases 
equity over time. The Kyoto scenario shows a trade off: less average consumption but more equity 
than a BAU scenario. By the Sen’s social welfare function the trade off is solved in favour of the 
Kyoto Protocol implementation.   12 
About the scenarios involving developing countries we find less average consumption and less 
equity than in a BAU or in a Kyoto scenario. Emissions constraints imposed to poor regions reduce 
world consumption growth and generate more inequality. There are two main differences between 
the GK and the GK2 scenario results: 
 
-  In the initial periods the emissions constraint is more stringent in the GK2 scenario for 
developing  countries  and  consequently  the  welfare  loss  is  higher.  In  2015  in  the  GK 
scenario poor regions are constrained by their level of BAU emissions and as consequence 
are not committed to decrease their level of economic activity; 
-  Over time the fixed emissions cap in the GK scenario is much more stringent than the 
increasing one in the GK2 scenario. Whereas in the GK scenario we register raising welfare 
losses, in the GK2 scenario we observe an opposite trend. 
 
Only a Kyoto scenario always shows welfare gains. Results suggest that an emissions stabilizing 
policy involving only developed countries is strongly recommendable. 
 
Table 2. A traditional measure of welfare: % differences of environmental policies vs BAU scenario. 1995-2085. 
  Kyoto vs BAU  GK vs BAU  GK2 vs BAU 
1995  0,000  0,000  0,000 
2005  0,000  0,000  0,000 
2015  -0,001  0,000  -0,001 
2025  -0,002  -0,002  -0,005 
2035  -0,003  -0,004  -0,008 
2045  -0,003  -0,006  -0,010 
2055  -0,004  -0,009  -0,011 
2065  -0,004  -0,012  -0,012 
2075  -0,004  -0,015  -0,013 
2085  -0,004  -0,018  -0,013 
 
Table 3.  The Sen’s Social Welfare function. Time period: 1995 – 2085. % differences of environmental policies 
vs BAU scenario. 
  Kyoto vs BAU  GK vs BAU  GK2 vs BAU 
1995  0,004  0,005  0,004 
2005  0,007  0,011  0,009 
2015  0,018  0,019  0,023 
2025  0,014  -0,067  -0,336 
2035  0,023  -0,204  -0,324 
2045  0,040  -0,370  -0,283 
2055  0,058  -0,567  -0,236 
2065  0,071  -0,795  -0,187 
2075  0,080  -1,045  -0,133 
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Table 4. The Sen’s Social Welfare function decomposition by per capita consumption (PCC, trillions of 1990 
US$/billions of population) and the Gini index. Time period: 1995 – 2085. 
      BAU      
   PCC  Gini  1-GINI  Utility 
1995  2,979  0,643  0,357  1,062 
2005  3,432  0,610  0,390  1,338 
2015  3,710  0,582  0,417  1,548 
2025  3,948  0,556  0,443  1,751 
2035  4,180  0,530  0,470  1,963 
2045  4,463  0,506  0,493  2,204 
2055  4,800  0,483  0,516  2,478 
2065  5,190  0,463  0,537  2,787 
2075  5,630  0,444  0,556  3,131 
2085  6,122  0,426  0,574  3,512 
 
    Kyoto     
  PCC  Gini  1-GINI  Utility 
1995  2,979  0,643  0,357  1,062 
2005  3,432  0,610  0,390  1,338 
2015  3,707  0,582  0,418  1,548 
2025  3,945  0,556  0,444  1,751 
2035  4,177  0,530  0,470  1,963 
2045  4,461  0,505  0,494  2,205 
2055  4,799  0,483  0,517  2,480 
2065  5,189  0,462  0,537  2,789 
2075  5,630  0,443  0,556  3,133 
2085  6,124  0,426  0,574  3,515 
 
    GK     
  PCC  GINI  1-GINI  Utility 
1995  2,979  0,643  0,357  1,062 
2005  3,432  0,610  0,390  1,338 
2015  3,709  0,583  0,417  1,548 
2025  3,945  0,556  0,444  1,750 
2035  4,173  0,531  0,469  1,959 
2045  4,452  0,507  0,493  2,196 
2055  4,784  0,485  0,515  2,464 
2065  5,166  0,465  0,535  2,765 
2075  5,598  0,447  0,553  3,098 
2085  6,080  0,430  0,570  3,466 
 
    GK2     
  PCC  GINI  1-GINI  Utility 
1995  2,979  0,643  0,357  1,062 
2005  3,432  0,610  0,390  1,338 
2015  3,707  0,582  0,418  1,548 
2025  3,939  0,557  0,443  1,745 
2035  4,170  0,531  0,469  1,957 
2045  4,454  0,507  0,493  2,198 
2055  4,792  0,484  0,516  2,472 
2065  5,183  0,463  0,537  2,781 
2075  5,625  0,444  0,556  3,126 
2085  6,121  0,427  0,573  3,509   14 
From the table 5 if we consider the UNDP social welfare function the results are quite similar. In 
the equation (12) the Gini concentration index does not play a role, but the consumption per capita 
of each region is weighted according to equity criteria. In the “Kyoto forever” scenario three effects 
influence welfare: 
 
-  Developed  countries  reduce  consumption  because  they  are  subject  to  an  emissions 
constraint; 
-  Eastern Europe Countries gain from the implementation of an emissions permits market 
because they are the most important permits sellers among Annex I regions; 
-  The  Kyoto  Protocol  implementation  generates  less  emissions  and  lower  environmental 
damages affecting also developing countries (see equations 4, 5, 6). 
 
Given  the  framework  of  equation  (12)  the  decrease  of  consumption  per  capita  for  developed 
countries  that  are  subject  to  an  emissions  constraint  has  a  lower  impact  than  the  gains  for 
developing regions and Eastern Europe Countries deriving respectively from a lower environmental 
damage  and  the  sell  of  permits  in  the  emissions  market.  For  this  reason  the  “Kyoto  forever” 
scenario provides the best welfare performances. 
 
Again GK and GK2 show high levels of welfare losses deriving from the high consumption per 
capita reductions in developing countries generated by the emissions constraint.  However as in the 
previous case the welfare loss seems to increase over time with a more severe emissions constraint 
as in the GK scenario. 
 
Table 5 The UNDP Social Welfare function. Time period: 1995 – 2085. % differences of environmental policies 
vs BAU scenario. 
  Kyoto vs BAU  GK vs BAU  GK2 vs BAU 
1995  0,002  0,002  0,002 
2005  0,004  0,004  0,004 
2015  0,021  0,002  0,022 
2025  0,020  -0,004  -0,027 
2035  0,018  -0,014  -0,029 
2045  0,017  -0,028  -0,029 
2055  0,017  -0,048  -0,027 
2065  0,018  -0,077  -0,024 
2075  0,019  -0,114  -0,019 
2085  0,019  -0,162  -0,012 
 
Finally we can comment social welfare deriving from the “subjective” definition of welfare. From 
the table 6 the reader can notice that again the “Kyoto forever” scenario is welfare improving over 
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Table  6  A  “subjective”  Social  Welfare  function.  Time  period:  1995  –  2085.  %  differences  of  environmental 
policies vs BAU scenario. 
  Kyoto vs BAU  GK vs BAU  GK2 vs BAU 
1995  0,000  0,001  0,001 
2005  0,001  0,002  0,001 
2015  0,002  0,003  0,002 
2025  0,002  0,000  -0,012 
2035  0,002  -0,006  -0,019 
2045  0,003  -0,013  -0,024 
2055  0,003  -0,021  -0,026 
2065  0,004  -0,029  -0,027 
2075  0,004  -0,038  -0,027 
2085  0,004  -0,046  -0,027 
 
 
The utility function of each region in the “subjective” welfare index is less equalitarian oriented. 
Whereas in the subjective index the logarithmic form of the utility function is the same for all the 
regions, in the UNDP index the elasticity of the marginal utility of income is higher for rich regions 
and the “weight” for developing regions is higher. A less equalitarian utility function, the presence 
of the discount rate and the fact that we sum weighted sums of consumption per capita over time 
does not qualitatively change our results when compared to those relative to the UNDP index. 
 
The “Kyoto forever” scenario is welfare improving, emissions stabilizing policies involving also 
developing  countries  are  welfare  reducing.  However if  the  emissions constraint  for developing 
countries is less severe welfare losses are lower. In this case we cannot register a decreasing level of 
welfare  loss  for  the  GK2  scenario.  Our  “subjective”  index  is  a  “stock”  measure  of  welfare 
depending on the cumulated sum of consumption flows over time. The decreasing path of welfare 
losses that we found in “flow” expressions of welfare is reflected in an increasing path of welfare 
loss with this “stock” index.  
 
These  results  clearly  explain  the  reluctance  of  the  European  Union  about  the  involvement  of 
developing countries in an international emissions stabilizing agreement:  it is preferable to obtain a 
small environmental improvement without negative welfare implications as the Kyoto Protocol 
rather than policies aimed at obtaining a turning point in the income/pollution relationship paying 
an high cost in terms of well-being as the GK scenario. 
 
Of course the American and European positions about the Kyoto Protocol ratification cannot be 
interpreted only on the basis of “altruistic” considerations. Past literature widely showed that the 
soft position of the European Union is mainly determined by the lower abatement costs than USA 
in Kyoto compliance costs (Nordhaus and Boyer 1999). 
 
However our aim is to underline a crucial policy implication: when we introduce a third dimension 
in the Environmental Kuznets Curve analysis, namely the welfare in our paper, the turning point 
existence is not crucial to extract useful environmental policy implications. The Kyoto Protocol 
reduces emissions if compared with a BAU scenario and is welfare improving on the basis of 
measures including economic and equity components. The implementation of “win-win” policies as 
the “Kyoto forever” scenario that do not reach a turning point in the relationship between income 
and  pollution  can  be  more  recommendable  than  strong  welfare  reducing  policies  as  the  GK 
scenario. 
   16 
5. Conclusions 
 
In  this  paper  we  investigated  four  scenarios  involving  different  hypothesis  about  regions’ 
participation  to  international  emissions  stabilizing  programs.  Following  a  multidimensional 
approach concerning sustainability we analysed the economic, social and environmental impact of 
each scenario. Specifically we studied the relationship between income and pollution and by non- 
New Welfare Economics approaches the level of welfare associated to each scenario. 
 
We found first that the only scenario implying a welfare and environmental improvement is the 
“Kyoto forever” one that does not generate a turning point in the PIR. Emissions constraints for 
developing countries are strongly welfare reducing. From this finding we can derive two important 
policy implications. 
 
First, the choice of the welfare measure to analyse policies is crucial. As we saw in our paper when 
we consider measures of welfare including equity criteria the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
is  more  preferable  than  a  no-policy  scenario.  We  obtain  the  opposite  result  with  a  traditional 
measure based on consumption. The welfare measure is a tool that must be cautiously managed by 
the policy maker. The “right” welfare measure will be chosen on the basis of the policy targets. A 
drawback of our analysis is that we worked on the basis of  “global” measures of welfare. The 
underlying hypothesis is that a World Agency is interested to account the world level of welfare in 
different scenarios and to choose the best option on the basis of a global interest. This could be 
considered as unrealistic. Game theory explains that in the global warming issue the most realistic 
view is to consider maximizing agents that behave on the basis of their own self-interests. Recent 
policies about debt cancellation and the Kyoto Protocol ratification of the most part of the Annex I 
countries are useful examples showing that in future years ethical and social justice could drive 
international policies in a context of global sustainability. This paper captures this alternative view. 
 
Second we analysed the role played by the existence of a turning point in the relationship between 
income and pollution as criterion to determine environmental policies. EKC hypothesis postulates 
that if we observe a bell shaped relationship between income and pollution, fostering economic 
growth is the best policy to tackle the pollution issue. The existence of a turning point is considered 
as the crucial factor in order to set an environmental policy and past theoretical and empirical 
literature mainly focussed on the shape of the relationship between income and pollution. In this 
paper we criticize this approach. We showed that the existence of a turning point could not be a 
suitable social choice criterion. The Environmental Kuznets Curve solves the traditional trade off 
between income and environment, but could be strongly welfare reducing. When we introduce other 
policy targets other than environment and income, the EKC could not be a suitable tool to suggest 
policies. The empirical observation of the relationship between income and pollution is a useful 
evidence for the policy maker in order to set environmental policies, but cannot considered as 
unique criterion. The seeking of “win-win” policies generating economic, social and environmental 
improvements also if they do not generate a turning point seems to be the best tool for social choice. 
 
However when we cannot find “win-win” policies the social choice theory should be the tool to 
solve  the  trade  offs.  All  the  literature  concerning  equity  since  the  Atkinson’s  findings  widely 
increased the opportunity to reach a social choice managing the trade off between economic and 
social variables. Further effort should be addressed to build social welfare functions to manage 
trade offs concerning all dimensions of sustainability: the economic, the environmental and the 
social one. The policy prescription deriving from the Environmental Kuznets Curve hypothesis 
seems not be sufficient to derive useful insights when more policy targets are involved. 
   17 
Further  research,  rather  than  focussing  on  the  existence  of  a  turning  point  in  the  relationship 
between income and pollution should be addressed to investigate multidimensional paths of relevant 
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